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I.  Introduction 
The question of whether nonprofit firms differ from their for-profit counterparts has 
presented a persistent puzzle for law and economics.  The hospital industry, in which for-profit, 
nonprofit, and government owned organizations operate side by side, has proved fertile ground 
for study.  Though the empirical evidence has been mixed, much of the research on hospitals has 
found behavioral similarities.  This is not surprising.  Given that these organizations have so 
much in common – they all offer medical care, use similar resources, operate under the same 
healthcare regulations, employ doctors and nurses who are trained in the same institutions – one 
would expect a convergence of behavior, if not firm types. 
The empirical results presented here are both new and surprising.  Like previous studies, 
this paper asks whether hospital types behave differently.  Yet, previous research has focused 
primarily on financial measures such as differences in costs, profits, billing, the value of 
uncompensated care, and responsiveness to financial pressure (for review see Sloan, 2000).  
Studying financial behavior yields an incomplete picture of hospital ownership.  Scholarship on 
medical care and ownership has generally considered single medical interventions.  Here, I 
examine whether and how organizational ownership is correlated with offering over thirty 
hospital services (see Table 1 for service list).  I find strikingly large behavioral differences.  
The results can be profitably used to examine economic theories on legal ownership.  
Here I explore three categories of theories:  1) “objectives theories” that maintain objective 
functions differ by ownership; 2) “capital prices theories” that maintain differences in capital 
sources constrain firm types to behave differently; 3) “market theories” that suggest firms 
respond to the ownership form of their competitors in the same market. 2 
I conclude that differences in firm objective functions better explain the behavioral 
differences identified here than do differences in capital costs.  For-profit hospitals are more 
profit-seeking than either nonprofit or public hospitals.  Government hospitals aim to provide 
needed, but unprofitable, goods to a greater degree than the other types.  Nonprofit hospitals are 
often in the middle.  To some extent, like for-profits, they pursue profits through offering 
profitable services and avoiding unprofitable services; to some extent, like public institutions, 
they provide for the public need by offering unprofitable, undersupplied services.  Further, the 
results suggest that nonprofit objectives may not be robust to competitive pressures since the 
ownership status of a hospital’s neighbors is correlated with its own medical service offerings. 
Identifying differences among ownership types is of practical consequence, both because 
of their potential relationship to health outcomes and the money at stake.  Expenditures on 
hospital care were $486.5 billion dollars (almost 5 percent of GDP) in 2002, and the average 
annual percentage growth rate is back on the rise (Heffler et al., 2004).  To justify -- or condemn 
-- the billions of public dollars that are spent on nonprofit tax-exemptions and other subsidies we 
need to know how these public resources are used.  While policymakers care a great deal about 
corporate ownership, taxation regimes and regulatory approaches have been mixed (for summary 
see Horwitz, 2003). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II summarizes contending 
models of firm ownership.  Section III presents the data and the empirical framework.  Results 
are presented in Section IV, and alternative explanations and sensitivity tests are presented in 
Section V.  Section VI concludes. 
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II.  Nonprofit Hospital Behavior:  Theories and Evidence 
Economists, health services researchers, and legal commentators have long debated the 
question of whether corporate ownership results in behavioral differences and why.  Ownership 
models can be categorized into three groups – objective function theories, capital constraint 
theories, and market interaction theories. 
 
A.  Objectives 
The primary theory of ownership status is that for-profits are profit-maximizers.  
Compared to other firm types, they are most likely respond to incentives (Danzon, 1982).  For 
example, they may avoid low-paying patients by differentially locating near hospitals of last 
resort (Barro, 1998) or up-coding to generate higher reimbursements (Silverman and Skinner, 
2000).  There is some evidence that for-profits have had the most success at profit-making.  At 
least during the 1990s, for-profit hospital margins were greater than those of government and 
nonprofit hospitals (Frank and Salkever, 2000).  On the contrary, some have claimed no 
difference in objectives (Malani and Choi, 2004).  Empirical studies have found little difference 
regarding hospital costs (Sloan et al., 2001, Snail and Robinson, 1998), the exercise of market 
power (Gaynor and Haas-Wilson, 1999), the adoption of technology (Sloan, Picone, Taylor Jr. 
and Chou, 2001), or responsiveness to legislation rewarding charity care (Duggan, 2000).   
At least relative to for-profits, nonprofit and government hospitals may prioritize goals 
other than profit-making.  (but see Danzon, 1982).  Government hospitals, many of which 
descend from almshouses, are required by the agencies that control them to serve the poor 
(Altman and Henderson, 1989).  Duggan (, 2000), for example, has found few barriers between 4 
government hospitals in California and controlling public entities, which reduced public 
subsidies in response to hospital revenue increases. 
According to most objectives theories, nonprofits, despite being private entities like for-
profit firms, are more likely than for-profits to adopt public goals.  For example, they may 
differentially respond to private (Salamon, 1987) and public (Weisbrod, 1988) market failures in 
serving the needy, or maximize quality and quantity over profits (Newhouse, 1970).  Rather than 
specifying the content nonprofit objective functions, however, most theorists have identified the 
mechanisms that cause nonprofits to adopt unique objectives.  First, legal constraints, such as the 
non-distribution constraint imposed by federal and state tax law (Hansmann, 1980) or charitable 
trust and corporations law (Horwitz, 2003), may both encourage, or even force, nonprofit 
hospitals to maximize non-financial ends, and signal those ends.   
Second, managerial behavior may differ among organizations.  Perhaps because they are 
not evaluated according to the profits they generate, managers guide firms in seeking rewards 
based on criteria like quantity and quality (Newhouse, 1970).  Alternatively, the form may attract 
special kinds of people.  These could be managers who wish to commit to donor preferences for 
non-contractible aspects of quality (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001) or those who hold particularly 
altruistic goals (Rose-Ackerman, 1996), such as a desire to cross-subsidize (James and Rose-
Ackerman, 1986).  Others suggest that the nonprofit form allows consumers to control the 
mission of the institution directly (Ben-Ner, 1983, Ben-Ner and Gui, 1993, James and Rose-
Ackerman, 1986).  Young (1981) outlines models in which physicians sort into different 
hospitals, types of hospitals, or regions according individual preferences for philanthropic 
behavior, among other preferences.  That total monetary compensation of top hospital employees 
is substantially higher in for-profit than not-for-profit hospitals lends support to this theory 5 
(Roomkin and Weisbrod, 1999).  A third and less benign theory of nonprofit objectives suggests 
that employees, through physician cartels, capture nonprofit hospitals and meet their personal 
interests through them (Pauly and Redisch, 1973). 
 
B.  Capital Price Constraints 
It may be that external financial constraints, rather than objectives that are adopted by 
special kinds of organizations or the type of managers who choose to constrain themselves, cause 
firm behavior.  Because hospital types raise capital from different sources, they face different 
capital costs (Gentry, 2002).  The simple capital price theory that I consider follows from this 
observation.  One variant is that for-profit hospitals face lower costs of capital than do nonprofit 
hospitals.  The idea is that for-profit hospitals can respond to demand for services more quickly 
than other corporations because equity financing is more readily available and less cumbersome 
to manage than debt financing (Hirth, 1999).  In the 1990s, over $100 billion was invested in 
health care stocks (Manning, 1997), suggesting that it was easy for for-profit hospitals to raise 
capital (Blecher, 1997).  Further, for-profit hospitals may have more flexibility in timing 
expenses because they may reinvest capital in hospital operations rather than paying interest.  In 
fact, some hospitals that have converted from nonprofit to for-profit form explain the change as 
an attempt to obtain needed capital for operations as well as new equipment and buildings 
(Cutler and Horwitz, 2000).  An implication of this view is that for-profit hospitals should show 
greater response to demand for capital-intensive services than other types of hospitals and, 
therefore, should have higher levels of investment in such services. 
A contrary variant of the capital price theory proposes that for-profit firms are constrained 
in investment relative to nonprofits because they face higher costs of capital.  Nonprofit hospitals 6 
have several advantages unavailable to for-profits.  For example, they may issue more forms of 
tax-exempt debt than for-profits
1 and may receive tax-exempt, tax deductible donations.  In 
addition, for those nonprofit hospitals with endowments, borrowing tax-exempt debt and some 
amounts of taxable debt
2 generates a tax arbitrage unavailable to for-profit hospitals (Gentry, 
2002, Wedig et al., 1996).  Empirical evidence demonstrates that nonprofit hospitals had a lower 
cost of capital than did for-profit hospitals during the 1970s, although the relationship reversed 
during the early 1980s (Wedig et al., 1989).  An implication of this view is that for-profit 
hospitals should show greater response to demand for capital-intensive services than other types 
of hospitals and, therefore, should have higher levels of investment in such services.  Regardless 
of which view is correct, if capital prices drive investment decisions, hospitals types should show 
different patterns of investment in expensive technology. 
 
C.  Market Effects 
A third theory explaining differential firm behavior is that firms are influenced by the 
ownership status of their neighbors, either through influencing the choice of objectives or 
constraining behavior through competition, though the direction of the influence has been 
debated.  Hansmann (1980) reasons that the presence of nonprofit firms will deter profiteering 
among for-profit health firms, while Cutler and Horwitz (2000) hypothesize that nonprofit and 
                                                 
1 The relative cost of capital is a complicated issue.  For example, for-profit hospitals borrow more than do nonprofit 
hospitals and, after accounting for tax deductions, taxable debt can represent a less expensive source of capital than 
tax-exempt debt (Frank and Salkever, 1994). 
2 Regulations limit the uses of tax-exempt debt available to nonprofit firms.  Nonprofits, for example, must use tax-
exempt debt proceeds on physical assets.  Between 1986 and 1997 there was a $150 million limit on outstanding 
non-hospital, tax-exempt debt.  (Gentry, 2002) 7 
government hospitals copy the behavior of new for-profit entrants in a hospital market.  Others 
contend that there should be no influence of for-profits on nonprofits or vice versa because, with 
higher operating costs and no endowments, for-profits are the marginal firm and, therefore, are 
the only institutions responding to market changes (Lakdwawalla and Philipson, 1999). 
There are few empirical studies that test the market effects theories.  Silverman and 
Skinner (2000) show not only that for-profit hospitals up-code to generate revenues more than 
other types, but that in heavily for-profit markets, nonprofit hospitals up-code at similar rates as 
for-profit hospitals.  Duggan (2000) demonstrates that nonprofit hospitals that faced for-profit 
competition were more likely than other nonprofits to respond to financial incentives to treat 
Medicaid patients under the California Disproportionate Share Program.  In a case study, Cutler 
and Horwitz (2000) find that nonprofit hospitals adopt the billing procedures of for-profit 
hospitals in the same markets.   
 
III.  Data and Methodology 
A.  Data 
Hospital data are from the American Hospital Association’s Annual Surveys of Hospitals 
(AHA), years 1988 – 2000.  Demographic data are from the 1990 U.S. Census.  The sample 
includes all non-rural, acute-care hospitals that operate in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) 
with at least two general medical and surgical hospitals, excluding military, uncategorized 
federal, and prison hospitals.  I excluded rural hospitals because there are relatively few rural, 
for-profit hospitals and they provide a limited range of services.  In 1995, for example, of the 
roughly 2,500 rural hospitals, only slightly more than 8 percent were for-profit and only a handful 
provided open-heart surgery. 8 
As Table 3 shows, over the study period slightly fewer than two-thirds of all hospitals 
were nonprofit, with for-profit and government hospitals making up roughly equal shares of the 
remainder.  These shares were relatively stable over time.  While there were conversions of 
hospitals from one form to another, the net flows were much smaller than the gross flows.  The 
total number of hospitals fell over the time period. 
I included all acute care services in the AHA surveys, with the exception of a small 
number for which the data were incomplete or the definition was too imprecise or inconsistent 
over the relevant time period to make valid comparisons. (See Table 1).  The AHA data include 
variables for services provided, number of beds, ownership status, teaching status, admissions, 
and location. (See Table 4). 
The AHA data have limitations.  First, the data are self-reported and not independently 
verified.  However, there is no a priori reason to suspect that data reliability is correlated with 
ownership.  Second, the format of the survey changed slightly over the years.  Hospitals were 
asked to choose whether a specific service (e.g. emergency department) was offered at the 
hospital, another hospital, or not available (1988-1993) or to answer “yes” if the service was 
offered at a hospital or subsidiary, as opposed to another location in the system, network, or joint 
venture (1994-2000).  Because I am interested in hospital-based activities, I recoded the first 
category in each year as “yes,” all other categories as “no,” with a separate category for non-
respondents.   
Finally, the data suffer from missing-values, particularly in the later years.  Almost 20 
percent of hospitals did not respond to the AHA survey and the non-respondents were 
disproportionately for-profit.  Of the sample used in this study, in 1988 approximately 3 percent 
of nonprofit, 4 percent of government, and almost 18 percent of for-profit hospitals did not report 9 
whether they offered emergency services.  By 2000, those percentages were about 14 percent for 
nonprofit, 20 percent for government, and 26 percent for for-profit hospitals. 
When hospitals did not report whether they offered a service, I imputed the values using 
data from the years before and after the missing year.  For the end years (1988 and 2000) I 
imputed a value based on whether the hospital offered the service for the next or previous two 
years.  Where several years of values were missing, I excluded the observation from the analysis.  
Generally, fewer than 4 percent of observations were imputed for each service. 
 
B.  Methodology 
I examine over thirty medical services singly to test whether individual service offerings 
differ by hospital ownership.  To assess the alternative explanations for offering patterns, I group 
the services.  First, to test the objectives theory, I examine whether hospital types differ in their 
likelihood of investing in profitable services, unprofitable services with high public need, and 
services with variable profits.  Second, to test the capital prices theory I examine whether 
different hospital types are more or less likely to offer services with high start-up costs and 
whether those differences narrow over time.  Finally, I investigate whether hospital types behave 
differently in markets with high for-profit hospital penetration.  Table 2 illustrates the behavior 
predicted by each of the theories. 
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i.  Objectives and Constraints 
To test my predictions, I estimated the following model:
3 
Probit(Prob(Service))it = ￿o + ￿1 Formit + ￿2 Yeart + ￿3 Yeart*Formit + ￿4 Hit + ￿5 Di                          (1) 
where FORM is a dummy variable for nonprofit, for-profit, or government ownership; Year is a 
year dummy variable; H are hospital characteristic variables including hospital size (measured as 
quartiles of admissions), teaching status (measured by teaching association membership), and a 
dummy variable for location by region in the country; D are demographic variables of the 
hospital’s vicinity (including percentages of the population by sex, white or African-American 
race, ln household income, age categories (<1, 1-18, 18-30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-65, >=65, >=80)).  
These were compiled from 1990 Census data arranged by aggregating census block groups that 
fell within a 10-mile radius of the center (by longitude and latitude) of the zip-code where the 
hospital operated.  This distance is commonly used in the literature, and 10.4 miles is the mean 
distance radius that captures 75 percent of discharges from acute care hospitals in urban settings 
(Gresenz et al., 2004).   
Because the probability of a hospital offering a service is not independent from one year 
to the next, I allowed for an arbitrary covariance matrix within each hospital over time.  I also 
adjusted the models for heteroskedasticity.  By varying only the corporate form of the hospital 
while holding the independent variables constant (at 1994 or next closest year levels), I predicted 
the probabilities that each hospital in each year would offer a given service.  Then I averaged the 
                                                 
3 One might think about using fixed effects to examine ownership, but doing so makes the estimation depend only on 
the experience of hospitals that switch form.  The sample of switching hospitals is small and likely to be biased in 
ways that are correlated with service offerings.  For example, money-losing hospitals are more likely to change form 
and also to forgo investment in services, plant, and equipment. 11 
individual predicted probabilities to obtain the probability that a hospital type offers a service 
each year.  Using the Probit model, I have assumed that the binary variable follows a binomial 
distribution. 
Determining what observed behavioral differences demonstrate about corporate intention 
is more difficult than establishing these differences.  Finding differences in behavior regarding 
one or two services, for example, would not provide enough evidence to infer motivation.  
However, by looking at many services, grouped by characteristics such as profitability, I am able 
to infer differences in objectives.  If, for example, one type of hospital differentially offers many 
of the most profitable services and systematically avoids the services that are relatively 
unprofitable (e.g. those that are often provided to an underinsured patient pool) that hospital’s 
behavior is more consistent with profit-seeking than the behavior of hospitals that provide 
money-losing services.  
Profitability, however, is not an inherent attribute of medical services, but depends on 
institutional-specific factors such as management skills, case mix, and local input costs.  Further, 
within a single hospital, costs and charges differ, discounts vary by individual payer, and 
allocation of joint costs blur the profitability picture.  Despite these complications one can, 
however, reasonably compare the relative profitability of services defined as bluntly as they are 
in the AHA data. 
I sorted the medical services into three profitability categories (those with high, low, and 
variable profitability) and then re-sorted the services according to the level of required initial 
investment.  Categories, reported in Table 1, are based on an exhaustive study of the relevant 
peer-reviewed, academic literature (medical, business, finance, statistics, sociology, and public 
policy), interviews with hospital administrators, doctors, and policy-makers, and analyses of the 12 
socioeconomic or insurance status of patients likely to demand various services.  Because 
Medicare payments are the largest single source of hospital revenues, I also analyzed the 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPac) and Prospective Payment Assessment 
Commission (ProPAC) reports to Congress for the relevant years.  Further, because this project is 
concerned primarily with hospital behavior and motivation, I checked the published, scientific 
literature with a comprehensive review of trade publications, business magazines, and newspaper 
reports.  The qualitative evaluation of relative service profitability was critical to the project 
because perceptions of whether a service would be profitable were likely as, possibly more, 
important determinants of service investment choices than whether services turned out to be 
profitable.  Regardless, there was little disagreement among these sources.  A full report is 
available online (Horwitz, 2005). 
Highly Profitable Services  Many of these services, such as cardiac care, are 
predominantly provided to older patients, patients who are insured through Medicare; during the 
early to mid-1990s, Medicare had a generous payment schedule relative to other types of 
insurance (Grossman, 2002).  By testing whether hospital types differentially provide services 
according to relative profitability, I am able to determine the relative degree to which the 
hospitals pursue profitability and, therefore, offer support for or against the objectives theory.  
The highly profitable services include angioplasty, birthing rooms, cardiac catheterization, 
diagnostic imagining equipment (computed-tomography scanner -- CT, diagnostic radioisotope 
facility, magnetic resonance imaging -- MRI, positron emission tomography -- PET, single 
photon emission computed tomography -- SPECT, and ultrasound), extracorporeal shock-wave 
lithotripter (ESWL), fitness center, neonatal intensive care, open heart surgery, pediatric 
intensive care, sports medicine, and women’s centers. 13 
Relatively Unprofitable Services for Needy Patients  The services in this category often 
answer public need, yet they are expensive to provide compared to available reimbursement or 
patient payments.  With the exception of emergency care,
4 hospitals are not required to offer 
these services.  I examine these services to determine whether hospital types differentially offer 
services that provide community benefits without the prospect of high profit.  Analyzing this 
group of services also helps evaluate one form of the objectives theory, one under which 
nonprofit and public hospitals have goals of altruism or meeting public need.  In this category, I 
include AIDS/HIV services (outpatient, testing, general services, special unit), alcohol and 
substance abuse inpatient and outpatient care, burn treatment, child and adolescent psychiatric 
services, emergency rooms, obstetrics services (measured by beds and deliveries), inpatient adult 
psychiatric care, psychiatric emergency services, and trauma centers. 
Services with Variable Profits  This category of services, services for which the 
opportunities for profit-making changed over the study period, includes the post-acute services 
skilled nursing and home health.  This category is particularly useful for testing relative 
objectives since it shows how service provision tracks changes in profitability. 
Capital Intensive Services  The final group of services is those for which capital costs are 
relatively high.  These include some diagnostic imaging equipment, cardiac services, birthing 
rooms, burn treatment, emergency rooms, ESWL, neonatal and pediatric intensive care, 
orthopedic surgery, and trauma centers.  If capital constraints are operating on for-profit 
hospitals, nonprofit hospitals should invest in capital-intensive services more than do others. 
                                                 
4 Approximately half of the states require hospitals to have emergency care facilities as a condition of licensure or 
funding (Showalter, 1999).  And, hospitals must provide emergency care as a condition of participating in the 
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ii. Market Effects 
To test whether the mix of hospital types in a market affects individual hospital 
operations, I test the interaction between corporate form and market. 
Probit(Prob(Service))it = ￿o + ￿1Formit + ￿2Yeart + ￿3Yeart*Formit + ￿4Marketit + ￿5 
Formit*Marketit + ￿6Yeart*Formit*Marketit + ￿7Hit + ￿8Dit                                                                          (2) 
 
where the market dummy variable identifies for-profit markets, defined as those metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSAs) in which for-profits represent more than a given percentage of 
admissions.  As in model 1, the observations were clustered according to hospital identification 
number, and I have assumed that the binary variable follows a binomial distribution.   
IV.  Results 
This section presents the findings for services that are representative of the four types – 
consistently profitable (open heart surgery), consistently unprofitable (psychiatric emergency), 
variably profitable (home health), and those with high capital costs (MRI and ESWL). 
 
A.  Objectives Theories 
i. Consistently Profitable Service:  Open Heart Surgery   
Although I focus on open-heart surgery in this section, the results for cardiac 
catheterization labs and angioplasty are remarkably similar.  Open heart surgery (coronary artery 
                                                                                                                                                             
Medicare program if the service area in which the hospital operates does not have adequate emergency care access. 15 
bypass graft or CABG) refers to one of two revascularization procedures used to improve blood 
supply to the heart after a patient suffers a heart attack by splicing a piece of vein or artery from 
another part of the body around the blocked artery.  Cardiac services -- including cardiac 
catheterization, angioplasty, and open-heart surgery – are, and are widely known to be, hospital 
profit centers (Stout, 2001, Wagner, 1991).  During the study period, for-profit corporations 
opened single-service cardiac surgery centers, while neighboring hospitals expected to lose 
profitable business (Dang, 2002, Devers et al., 2003, Gallagher, 1998, Ginsburg, 2000, Meyer, 
1998, Romano, 2004, Winslow, 1999).  
There is considerable evidence that cardiac care’s reputation as a money maker is 
justified.  As surgical services, heart attack treatments are typically well-reimbursed by insurers 
(Brennan, 2002, Cutler et al., 2000).  Since most are Medicare beneficiaries, patients receiving 
open-heart surgery are unusually well insured.  Insurers typically reimburse heart attack 
treatments at high rates; patients receiving CABG are unusually well insured since most are 
covered Medicare; and, there is high and increasing spending on cardiac care (Cutler, McClellan 
and Newhouse, 2000).  From 1984 to 1994, the real price for bypass surgery among Medicare 
patients increased by 2.3 percent annually from $29,176 to $36,564 (1991 dollars) while the 
share of patients receiving the treatment increased by one percentage point annually from 5 to 15 
percent (Cutler et al., 2001).  The costs of supplying CABG in real terms were either flat or fell 
during the same period (Cutler and Huckman, 2003).  In 1991, because spending on bypass 
surgery was so high, the Health Care Financing Administration ran a pilot program in which 
hospitals and physicians negotiated bypass surgery prices (Cromwell et al., 1997). 
Appendix A reports estimates from the basic specification of the probability of offering 
open heart surgery by ownership type, controlling for hospital and demographic characteristics.  16 
These results demonstrate that for-profits are more likely to offer open heart surgery than 
nonprofits, which in turn are more likely to do so than government hospitals.  Specifically, the 
null hypotheses that for-profit, nonprofit, and government provision of open heart surgery are 
jointly equal
5 to each other (the coefficients on the corporate form and corporate form * year 
interaction variables for one form are jointly equal to those of another form) can be rejected at 
the .01 level. 
The magnitude of these differences is large.  The differences can be seen best in Figure 1, 
which plots the Probit predicted probabilities of service offerings by hospital type, controlling for 
the hospital and demographic characteristics discussed above.  For-profits are, on average, 13 
percentage points more likely than government hospitals (40.9% v. 27.9%, P<0.001) and 7.3 
percentage points more likely than nonprofit hospitals (40.9% v. 33.6%, P<0.001) to offer open-
heart surgery (See Table 7 for hypothesis tests).  
Over the study period, the probability of offering open heart surgery increased for all 
three types of hospitals.  Again, this is easiest to see in Figure 1.  The relationship can also be 
seen by the positive, significant, and increasing coefficients on the year dummies, and the mostly 
small and insignificant coefficients on the year*gov and year*fp interactions, which indicate that 
the relationship between the forms remained stable over time (See Appendix A).   
The pattern of service provision for open heart surgery supports the theory that the 
hospital types have different objectives.  This evidence alone, however, does not help 
                                                 
5 I conducted two sets of hypothesis tests: 1) tests on whether the coefficients on the corporate form and corporate 
form * year interaction variables for one form (e.g. for-profit) are jointly different those of another form (e.g. 
nonprofit) and 2) tests on whether the average of these coefficients are different among forms.  These hypothesis 
tests, which I refer to as the Joint Tests and the Average Tests, are presented in Table 7.  17 
differentiate among two possible goals.  For-profits may be more interested than other types in 
offering either all medical services or profitable services. 
 
ii.  Consistently Unprofitable:  Psychiatric Emergency   
Conversely, hospital-based, psychiatric emergency services are relatively unprofitable for 
several reasons.  First, the emergency room is generally an unprofitable setting, which attracts 
patients whose admissions are relatively expensive (Deloitte & Touche, 1990, Gentry and 
Penrod, 2000, Melnick et al., 1989).  During the study period, many providers believed that 
emergency care was unprofitable, in part, because public reimbursement did not include 
additional payments for emergency care that precedes inpatient care and, therefore, did not cover 
costs such as licensing and standby costs (Eisenberg, 1990).  Whether reimbursements are 
actually sufficient to cover the costs of emergency care prior to admission, however, depends on 
the total level of reimbursement for the admission. 
Second, psychiatric care reimbursement is uncertain and often low relative to cost 
(Woodward et al., 1997).  Psychiatric emergency patients are dominated by two groups of 
patients characterized as “bad payers” – the Medicaid population and the uninsured (Gottlieb, 
2002).  During the 1990s, both private and public payers sought methods to control mental health 
costs.  State Medicaid programs facing budget shortfalls often cut mental health services, 
including services previously available in state psychiatric hospitals, to balance budgets (BNA 
Health Care Daily, 1995).  The rapid expansion of mental health carve-out programs and other 
cost-control methods also led to low provider payments in private settings.   
Third, mental health services attract a poor, poorly insured, sick, and difficult to manage 
population
 (Woodward, Epstein, Gfroerer, Melnick, Thoreson and Wilson, 1997).  The patients 18 
that use psychiatric emergency care, for example, are particularly underprivileged (Dhossche and 
Ghani, 1998).  Young adults, who are disproportionately uninsured are overrepresented as mental 
health patients, while the elderly, who are insured by Medicare, are underrepresented (Ellison et 
al., 1986).  One studied demonstrated that mental health patients are disproportionately sick, 
uninsured, and difficult to manage (Shwed, 1980, Tye, 2001).  Further, approximately 7 to 18 
percent of psychiatric emergency patients and one-third of the visits are difficult-to-treat, repeat 
visitors with chronic conditions (Ellison, Blum and Barksy, 1986). 
Finally, not offering psychiatric emergency capacity may protect hospitals from liability 
under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA).  EMTALA requires 
hospitals that both have emergency rooms and serve Medicare beneficiaries to stabilize 
emergency patients, including emergency psychiatric conditions,
6 before transferring them to 
another hospital.
7  Emergency rooms, however, are only required to screen and stabilization 
patients with conditions that fall within the emergency room’s capabilities.  If a hospital does not 
offer psychiatric treatment or have mental health professionals on staff, EMTALA does not 
require it to stabilizing emergency psychiatric patients before transferring them,
8 thus making it 
easier to transfer a class of poorly insured, high-risk patients. 
Appendix A contains estimates from the basic specification.  These results demonstrate 
that, unlike open heart surgery, for-profits are less likely than nonprofits, which in turn are less 
likely than government hospitals to offer this unprofitable service (See Figure 2).  Specifically, 
the null hypotheses that, for all thirteen years, 1) for-profit and government hospitals and, 2) 
                                                 
6 Psychiatric disturbances may constitute an emergency condition.  42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b)(i) (2000). 
7 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395(d)(d). 19 
nonprofit and government hospitals are equally likely to offer the services can be rejected at the 
.001 level.  The null hypothesis that the for-profit and nonprofit hospitals are jointly equal cannot 
be rejected (See Table 7). 
On average from 1988 to 2000, 41 percent of for-profit hospitals were predicted to offer 
psychiatric emergency services, compared to 48 percent of nonprofit hospitals and 56 percent of 
government hospitals.  The null hypotheses that these averages are equal can be rejected at the 
.001 level (See Table 7 for details).  The magnitude of these differences is large – for-profits are 
15 percentage points more likely to offer psychiatric emergency services than are government 
hospitals.  This can be seen best in Figure 2, which plots the Probit predicted probabilities of 
offering psychiatric emergency care by hospital type. 
In addition, the probability of offering psychiatric emergency services remained flat over 
time, and the relationship among types remained approximately constant.  It is easiest to see this 
in Figure 2.  The relationship can also be seen by the mostly small and insignificant coefficients 
on the year dummies and on the year*gov and year*fp interaction terms in Appendix A, which 
indicate that the relationships among hospital types remained stable over time. 
The investment patterns for psychiatric emergency care also lend support to the objectives 
theory.  Government hospitals appear relatively more willing to invest in a service that is needed 
by the public than are nonprofits which are, in turn, more willing to provide the service than are 
for-profit hospitals.  This evidence, coupled with the evidence from open heart surgery, supports 
the view that hospital types differ according to their interest in pursuing profits rather than the 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 Baker v. Adventist Health, Inc. 260 F.3d 987 (9
th Cir. 2001). 20 
view that hospital types differ according to their interest in pursuing more or fewer services per 
se. 
 
iii.  Service with Variable Profitability:  Home Health Care   
Changes in the profitability of post-acute services, such as home health and skilled 
nursing,
9 make them particularly useful services to test the relative responsiveness of hospitals to 
financial incentives in their service investments and, therefore, to infer the goals they pursue.  
With the implementation of the prospective payment system in 1984, post-acute services became 
very profitable.  Unlike acute services payments for which hospitals receive a single per-episode 
payment for each patient, Medicare paid a cost-related reimbursement for post-acute services.  
For example, home health services were reimbursed according to cost, up to 112 percent of the 
national mean cost per visit (Newhouse, 2002b).  In addition, the payment system was 
particularly generous to entrants, exempting skilled nursing facilities and home health services 
from cost limits for the first three to four years of operation (Newhouse, 2002a).   
These generous reimbursements coupled with the fixed payment built into the Medicare 
payment system made post-acute services particularly valuable for acute care hospitals.  Rather 
than receiving a single payment for an inpatient, hospitals could increase reimbursements by 
unbundling the services and transferring a patient to a post-acute bed at the end of their hospital 
stay.  There is considerable evidence of these transfers.  Between 1988 and 1996 acute care 
lengths of stay fell 27 percent for Medicare patients and only 15 percent for all patients; during 
                                                 
9 I have eliminated rehabilitation services from the analysis because the AHA survey does not specify the 
rehabilitation unit type, which strongly affects service profitability. 21 
the same period post-acute service usage and payment rose rapidly (Newhouse, 2002b).  Finally, 
the hospital could allocate joint costs to these units, increasing the total reimbursement to the 
hospital.  The rapid increase in Medicare spending on and utilization of post-acute services 
reflects response to these incentives.  Home health payments grew from $3.9 billion to over 
$18.3 billion between 1990 and 1996 (Liu et al., 1999).  Although the incentives for providing 
post-acute services were in place in the early-1980s, it was not until the late 1980s that eligibility 
and coverage guidelines were clarified in federal court decisions.
10   
The potential profitability of these services was widely understood by hospital 
administrators, consultants, and regulators alike (Geriatric Health Ventures Incorporated, 1992, 
Helbing and Cornelius, 1992, Helbing et al., 1992, Scharmach, 1990, Wagner, 1989).  One article 
in the trade press, for example, urged hospital administrators to view skilled nursing facilities as 
a “higher reimbursement category, not necessarily a geographic location” (Deangelis, 1987).  In 
the early 1990s, regulators searched for solutions to contain post-acute service spending, which 
they believed was unnecessary (Vladeck and Miller, 1994).  Observers predicted that these 
services would remain profitable even if capitated (1993, Fowler, 1992, Lutz, 1992, O' Donnell, 
1993).   
The profit-making opportunities of post-acute care plummeted with the 1997 Balanced 
Budget Act (BBA).  Medicare payments were reduced, the Health Care Financing Agency 
developed a prospective payment system for post-acute services, and spending on home health 
care fell by a factor of two. 
                                                 
10 Duggan v. Bowen 691 F.Supp. 1487 (1988), effective 1989, made patients who would be stabilized by home 
health services, in addition to patients who would be improved by the services, eligible for the services. 22 
Appendix A contains estimates from the basic specification.  Not only did the 
probabilities of offering home health care vary by ownership, the relative differences among 
types varied over time.  The probabilities of offering home health services when the service was 
profitable increased for all three hospital types.  As can be seen in Figure 3, however, the growth 
of home health care when profitable and the decline when unprofitable among for-profit hospitals 
were particularly dramatic.  From 1988 to 1996, the probability of a for-profit hospital offering 
home health services more than tripled (17.5 percent to 60.9 percent).  During the same period, 
the probability of offering home health care only grew slightly over 10 percentage points (40.9 
percent to 51.7 percent) for nonprofit and 14 percentage points (38.1 percent to 51.9 percent) for 
government hospitals.   
From 1997 to 2000, as home health care became relatively unprofitable with the BBA’s 
implementation, the probability of offering it fell a striking 37.5 percentage points among for-
profits, 7.7 percentage points among nonprofits, and 1.5 percentage points among government 
hospitals.  All relevant null hypotheses can be rejected at the 0.01 level.  This finding provides 
important evidence regarding the magnitude (large) and speed (fast) of for-profit responsiveness 
to incentives. 
 
B.  Capital Prices Theory   
This section discusses two representative services, Extracorporeal Shock Wave 
Lithotripsy (ESWL) and Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI), to test the capital constraint 
theory.  In 1984, the Food and Drug Administration approved the use of Extracorporeal Shock 
Wave Lithotripters, machines that uses shock waves to shatter kidney stones or gallstones.  
Because the typical lithotripter costs about $1 million, only approximately 240 hospitals in the 23 
country had them in the early 1990s but, in 1991, there were reports that a new, much less 
expensive machine was being developed (1991).   
MRI allows technicians to determine tissue types by looking at a map of how hydrogen 
nuclei in different parts of the body respond to the magnetic field generated by the machine.  Like 
all diagnostic imaging equipment, magnetic resonance imaging technology is very expensive; a 
typical machine, excluding installation and licensing fees, costs approximately $1.5 million 
(Anonymous Interviewee, 2002).  
Appendix A contains estimates from the basic specifications.  Consistent with theories 
about technology diffusion, all types of hospitals were more likely to have MRIs and ESWLs 
over time.  The patterns of adoption, however, were quite different.  As can be seen most easily 
in Figure 4, for-profit hospitals were always more likely to offer ESWL services during the years 
studied.  On average, 22 percent of for-profit hospitals, 17 percent of nonprofit hospitals, and 13 
percent of public hospitals were likely to offer ESWL.  These differences are significant at, at 
least, the 0.003 level (Table 7). 
On the other hand, for-profits were only slightly more likely than nonprofit hospitals to 
have MRIs.  On average, 51 percent of for-profit hospitals and 48 percent of nonprofit hospitals, 
controlling for hospital and demographic characteristics, were predicted to have MRIs.  The 
difference is insignificant (See Table 7).  Further, the relative probability of offering the service 
changed over time.  Between 1988 and 1992, nonprofit hospitals were predicted to be more likely 
than for-profit hospitals to have MRIs; between 1993 and 1998, for-profits were more likely than 
nonprofits to offer the service.  Government hospitals were, on average, approximately 7 to 10 
percentage points less likely than either of the other types to offer MRI (See Figure 5).  Neither 
of these services demonstrated either hypothesized pattern of the capital constraint theory -- a 24 
pattern of investment in which either for-profit or nonprofit hospitals consistently invest more in 
these services. 
 
C.  Looking Across all the Technologies 
Table 5 summarizes the results for all tested services.  Although for-profit hospitals were 
only somewhat more likely than nonprofits to offer profitable services, both for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals were considerably more likely than government hospitals to offer profitable 
services.  For-profits were less likely than nonprofits, which in turn were less likely than 
government hospitals, to offer unprofitable services.  The objectives theory is further supported 
by the patterns of offering services with variable profits.  As can be seen in Table 6, for-profits 
exhibited dramatic responsiveness to financial incentives, particularly in terms of investing in 
post-acute services as they became profitable and divesting from them as they became 
unprofitable. 
The services examined in the study demonstrated neither pattern predicted by the capital 
prices theory.  For-profits were less likely than nonprofits to have birthing rooms, a capital 
intensive service, during the early years of the study (in 1988 F=64% v. N=70%), but by 2000 
that gap shrank (F=75% v. N=77%).  Government hospitals were less likely than the other types 
to have CAT scanners, another capital intensive service, during the early years of the study (e.g., 
in 1988 F=88%, G=80%, N=87%), but by 2000 they were more likely to have them (F=93%, 
G=96%, N=95%).  From these results it appears that access to equity capital did not lead for-
profit hospitals to consistently make greater investments in expensive technology than 
nonprofits.  (See Table 5, services with high initial capital needs in italics).  Nor did access to 25 
tax-exempt debt, endowment, or tax arbitrage opportunities lead nonprofit hospitals to 
consistently make greater investments in expensive technology than for-profits.   
 
D.  Market Results 
To appraise the market theory, I asked whether hospital types offered different services 
depending on the for-profit penetration in the local markets.  To do this, I tested the interactions 
between ownership form and a dummy variable for for-profit markets, defined as metropolitan 
statistical areas with greater than or equal to 20 percent for-profit admissions.  I chose this 
breakpoint because few hospitals operate in markets with higher for-profit penetration, though 
tests of markets with greater than or equal to 10 percent for-profit admissions on a more limited 
data set yielded similar results.  Measured by the share of hospital admissions in an MSA, the 
mean for-profit share market share was 0.115, the median was 0.045, and the standard deviation 
was 0.149. 
The market regressions support the theory that hospitals, particularly for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals, learn from or compete with neighboring hospitals.  The results also support, 
albeit with limited evidence, the idea that nonprofit hospitals copy the profit-making techniques 
of their for-profit neighbors.  Again, I focused on three representative services to determine 
whether hospital types offered different services in for-profit and other markets. 
All hospital types were more likely to offer open heart surgery, a very profitable service, 
in markets with at least 20 percent for-profit market share than in other markets (See Appendix B 
and Figures 6, 7, 8).  Nonprofit hospitals, for example, were on average 5.4 percentage points 
more likely to offer open heart surgery in markets with at least 20 percent for-profit penetration 
than in other markets (differences significant at 0.05 percent level, See Table 8 for hypothesis 26 
tests).  For-profit and government hospitals followed a similar pattern, offering open heart 
surgery at a greater rate in for-profit markets than in other markets (See Figure 6).  Although the 
results for for-profit hospitals were not statistically significant for the full study period, excluding 
the most recent two years of data (1999 and 2000), there were large and significant differences.  
At least for this profitable service, having for-profit neighbors matters. 
The results for home health were similar for nonprofit hospitals.  Nonprofit hospitals 
were more likely to offer home health in for-profit markets than in other markets during almost 
the entire period (See Figure 7).  These results, coupled with open heart surgery, might seem to 
suggest that hospitals are more likely to offer all services in for-profit markets than in other 
markets.  However, there is reason to reject this theory.  First, though nonprofits were more likely 
to offer home health in for-profit markets throughout the study period, the largest gap came 
during the particularly profitable period for investment from 1993 through 1996.  Further, for-
profit hospitals were only more likely to provide home health in for-profit markets than in other 
markets during this profitable period (See Figure 8).  There was no statistically significant 
difference between government hospitals in for-profit and other markets during this period. 
On the contrary, on average over the thirteen years studied, for-profit hospitals were 
equally likely to offer psychiatric emergency services in both types of markets (See Figure 8).  
However, government hospitals were 4.6 percentage points more likely to provide psychiatric 
emergency care in for-profit markets than in others, although the difference was not statistically 
significant.  Nonprofit hospitals were also 4.5 percentage points more likely to offer this 
unprofitable service and the results were statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  Interestingly, 
during the later years of the study period, nonprofits in for-profit markets seem to be exiting the 
psychiatric emergency business.  While from 1988 to 1993 there was little difference in the 27 
probability of offering the service in each type of market, from 1994 to 2000, nonprofits in for-
profit markets were approximately 7.1 percentage points less likely to have the service than those 
in other markets.  The null hypothesis that the probabilities were equal was rejected at the 0.05 
percent level. 
These results, coupled, with the results for open heart surgery, support the claim that 
nonprofit hospitals are influenced by the behavior of their for-profit neighbors.  They are more 
likely to offer profitable services and less likely to offer unprofitable services in markets with 
relatively higher for-profit penetration. 
 
V.  Alternative Explanations and Sensitivity Tests 
A.  Alternative Explanations 
There are two alternative explanations to the results, both raising potential endogeneity 
concerns with the model.  First, as Wennberg (1999) and others have observed, medical service 
provision varies considerably by small geographic region.  Norton and Staiger (1994) have 
further shown that relatively low uncompensated care provision at for-profit hospitals can be 
explained, in part, by location.  Using a case study approach for three markets, McClellan and 
Staiger suggested that for-profit hospitals locate in areas with low hospital quality (McClellan 
and Staiger, 2000).  One might think, therefore, that firm types pick small areas in which to 
operate based on the character of demand in those areas, such as patient demand or physician 
preference for open heart surgery or medical management.  Where demand for profitable services 
is greatest, therefore, one would expect more for-profit firms than in other areas.   
I tested this alternative explanation for the results by using a fixed-effects approach, 
including an indicator variable for the year 2000 Hospital Referral Regions (HRR) in which each 28 
hospital operates.  The coefficient implications produced by additional analyses of the three 
representative services described above (open heart surgery, psychiatric emergency care, and 
home health care) remained the same.  The relevant differences remained significant at the one 
percent level with one exception.  The average difference between nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals offering open heart surgery was significant at the one percent level, however tests for 
the joint difference lost significance. 
These results are not only quantitatively reassuring; they make sense.  First, medical 
services differ in important ways from uncompensated care, the good studied by Norton and 
Staiger in 1994.  It is likely easier for hospitals to avoid locations in which there is likely to be 
considerable demand for uncompensated care than demand for a bundle of unprofitable medical 
services.  In fact, the early wave of hospital purchases by for-profit chains were in relatively 
wealthy suburban areas, where there are comparatively few uninsured patients.  To predict the 
demand for a large number of services, potential hospital purchasers would need to know details 
about patient population risk and insurance characteristics that are hard to find and, moreover, 
change over time.  A much easier strategy for a hospital wishing to earn profits would be to limit 
offerings of unprofitable services.  Second, based on how hospital conversion markets work, the 
objectives explanation is more plausible than the geographic selection story.  For-profit chains 
have typically bought hospitals that were for sale, often because they were failing financially 
(Picone et al., 2002). 
A second alternative explanation is that individual hospitals choose ownership form 
based on their financial status.  Profitable hospitals choose for-profit status, unprofitable 
hospitals choose nonprofit status.  This explanation, however, is at odds with conversion 
experience.  Failing hospitals, not profitable hospitals, typically convert from nonprofit to for-29 
profit status (Picone, Chou and Sloan, 2002).  In addition, hospital reimbursement and financial 
margins are uncertain and fluctuate considerably over relatively short time periods (See, e.g., 
Commission, 2004).  Even if hospitals could reasonably predict reimbursement and profitability, 
changes in ownership are costly in several respects.  Legal permissions are difficult to secure and 
challenges likely, professional legal and consulting costs are high, and reputational effects can be 
large. 
 
B.  Propensity Scores and Other Sensitivity Tests 
The results were robust to several other sensitivity tests on the three representative 
services.  Because size is the best predictor of offering any service, I restricted the regressions to 
the observations in the top two quartiles, bottom two quartiles, and middle two quartiles of 
hospitals measured by number of admissions to the hospital.  Restricting the tests to the smallest 
hospitals, those in the bottom two admissions quartiles, the finding that nonprofit hospitals were 
more likely than government hospitals to offer open heart surgery was not significant.  This result 
is not surprising because so few small hospitals offer open heart surgery at all.  Like open heart 
surgery, among the smallest hospitals, the finding that nonprofit hospitals were more likely than 
for-profit hospitals to offer psychiatric emergency services was not significant. 
To test the sensitivity of the results to demographic characteristics, I added age-squared 
categories for percentage of the population over 65 years and over 80 years.  Because state 
payment policies for mental health services vary considerably, I included state dummies and 
state-year interactions for the psychiatric emergency service probit estimations.  To test variation 
within the government hospital category, I excluded veterans’ hospitals.  The probability that 
nonprofit and non-veteran government hospitals were equally likely to offer psychiatric 30 
emergency services could not be rejected at the 0.10 level.  In addition, because firm types tend 
to cluster in different regions I altered the region variable to account for areas of high for-profit 
penetration (e.g. south
11 and southwest
12) and included dummy variables for all nine regions 
listed in the AHA dataset. 
Finally, I reanalyzed the three services using propensity scores, a method used to make 
causal inferences when assignment to a group, such as corporate ownership, is not random 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1984).  This method allowed me to ensure that I had compared 
hospitals that differed primarily by ownership and not other characteristics such as hospital size.  
More specifically, I determined the conditional probability of corporate ownership (nonprofit v. 
for-profit; nonprofit v. government, government v. for-profit) given the observed characteristics 
used in the Probit estimates (the propensity scores), created five subcategories defined by the 
estimated propensity score, and predicted the probability of a hospital type offering a service in a 
given year controlling for the propensity grouping.  These tests did not change the results 
reported above in any meaningful way.
13  The null hypothesis that nonprofit and government 
hospitals were equally likely to offer open heart surgery could not be rejected at the 0.05 level 
(p=0.078). 
 
                                                 
11 Southern region includes:  Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, 
Alabama, Mississippi, and Kentucky.   
12 Southwestern region includes:  Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and Nevada. 
13 The predicted probabilities of offering a service were slightly different than those produced by the Probit tests 
because the predictions were generated only from subsets of the data (e.g. only nonprofits and for-profits; only 
public and nonprofits).  The relationships among the hospitals, however, were consistent with the Probit results. 31 
VI.  Conclusion 
The empirical findings – that different hospital types offer different services, varying 
systematically with their profitability – challenge an emerging view that there are few differences 
among the nonprofit and for-profit forms (Sloan, 2000).  The magnitude and robustness of the 
findings are striking in themselves, particularly given the blunt nature of the dependent variables 
and hospitals’ regulatory context. 
Plausible ownership theories should account for all three firm types.  These results 
undermine two reasonable hypotheses about behavioral differences.  Neither (1) the divide 
between government and private (both for-profit and nonprofit) institutions, nor (2) the divide 
between profit-distributing and non-distributing (both nonprofit and government) institutions can 
explain the differences described here.  Although nonprofits are similar to for-profit hospitals 
because they are both private entities, they differ in their responsiveness to incentives.  Although 
nonprofits are similar to government hospitals because they are legally prohibited from 
distributing profits to owners, nonprofits are not substitutes for government hospitals in the 
provision of unprofitable services that are disproportionately demanded by needy patients. 
The results also undercut the simple capital prices theory.  There is no clear pattern that 
relative access or costs of capital constrain hospitals by type.  More work on the question, 
however, is needed.  These results may be because there are many factors that contribute to the 
decision and ability to invest in technology, capital costs only representing one.  Licensing 
requirements under certificate-of-need programs, for example, could prevent hospitals from 
investing in a service despite easy access to low cost capital.  Or, differences in the sources of 
capital may be over estimated.  With increasing hospital consolidation and the growth of hospital 
chains, nonprofit hospitals may operate internal capital markets that make them more similar to 32 
for-profit capital markets than this theory suggests.  Likewise, the greater flexibility of equity 
capital may also be overestimated since, for example, for-profits may issue certain forms of tax-
exempt debt and nonprofits have access to flexible funds such as endowment (Frank and 
Salkever, 2000, 1994). 
In light of this evidence, the objectives theories seem more plausible than the capital 
prices theories.  Although specifying non-financial objective functions is difficult, the evidence 
bolsters the theory that government hospitals are hospitals of last resort.  They are more likely 
than other types to offer unprofitable services that are generally needed by poor, underinsured 
patients.  Nonprofit hospitals are the intermediate type.  They are less responsive to financial 
incentives than for-profit and mores so than government hospitals, both in offering profitable and 
avoiding unprofitable services.  They are also less likely than government hospitals to offer 
unprofitable, undersupplied services. 
The results shed some light on the content of the nonprofit objective function as well.  
While profit-making must be in the objective function of all hospitals, it is likely lower on the list 
for nonprofits than for-profits.  Controlling parties – be they managers, directors, doctors, or 
consumers – are making different choices that vary systematically by ownership.  Further, the 
evidence presented here challenges the capture models, at least in their extreme forms, of 
nonprofit organizations (see, e.g., Pauly and Redisch, 1973).  If doctors or other powerful 
nonprofit hospital employees were effectively maximizing their incomes, nonprofit hospitals 
would not offer unprofitable services.  Perhaps hospital directors or regulations constrain 
employee capture, but the evidence presented here is consistent with a story of employee 
altruism. 33 
Interestingly, despite notoriously weak enforcement mechanisms, the results are 
consistent with law which requires nonprofits to act in the public interest (for detail on nonprofit 
law see Horwitz, 2003).  More concretely, nonprofits are not required to offer unprofitable 
services but they choose to do so.  Aside from the few jurisdictions in which attorneys general 
had and used their power to control hospital behavior during the study period, nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals had the same opportunities to open and close units, and they faced the same 
public relations problems in doing so. 
The results raise two further puzzles that need more attention.  First, why do for-profits 
offer any unprofitable services?  Businesses trying to maximize profits should not offer 
unprofitable product lines.  For-profit hospitals, unlike other businesses however, maximize 
profits subject to a series of constraints having to do with the goods they provide.  In addition, 
there are important, perhaps life-saving complementarities among health services.  Institutions 
that provide surgical services, for example, need expensive and, often unprofitable, emergency 
support systems.  In fact, opponents of single service specialty hospitals, such as freestanding 
cardiac centers, argue that specialty hospitals with limited emergency facilities jeopardize patient 
safety (Devers, Brewster and Ginsburg, 2003).  Also, offering some unprofitable services such as 
obstetrical care is necessary to signal to doctors, patients, and insurers that the hospital is a full-
service institution.  Finally, some services are loss-leaders.  Unprofitable obstetric care, for 
example, attracts female patients who bring their families’ profitable business to the hospital. 
Second, why don’t nonprofit hospitals offer all the profitable services as well as some 
unprofitable services?  After all, nonprofits must value profits to some degree, even if less than 
for-profit hospitals, and they could use the proceeds to cross-subsidize.  There are several 
plausible answers.  For example, nonprofit hospitals may stick to core services like obstetrics and 34 
emergency care.  The evidence here is mixed, showing that although nonprofits are less likely 
than for-profits to have a women’s center or home health care, they are also more likely to have 
peripheral services like fitness centers. 
Another plausible answer, following Newhouse’s model, is that nonprofits differentially 
value quality.  The evidence presented here is consistent with the quality explanation.  It is 
unlikely that the most profitable mix of services is the most medically appropriate mix.  Public 
payment rates are set through a complex and changing process based on, among other factors, the 
evolving judgment or reacting to past errors of rate-setters, imperfect adjustments for 
demographic and geographic characteristics of hospital markets, and the political strength of 
interested parties.  Private payment rates also result from complex negotiations and relative 
bargaining power.  This messy process does not inspire faith that regulators have found the right 
price in terms of medical quality.  For these reasons, the rapid and large responses to changes in 
post-acute care profitability raise doubts that those changes were initiated for quality reasons.  
We need more study on how and, indeed, whether these processes produce incentives for 
hospitals to provide a medically appropriate service mix. 
The preliminary results also suggest that hospital behavior depends on the ownership of 
its neighbors.  Nonprofits and for-profits are both more likely to offer a profitable service and 
less likely to offer an unprofitable service in for-profit markets than in other markets.  
Government hospitals, however, appear to be relatively robust to outside influence; while they 
were more likely to offer a profitable service in for-profit markets than other markets, the results 
did not extend to unprofitable or variable profit services.  The sensitivity tests related to 
geography, particularly the HRR fixed effects tests, suggest that there is a neighboring hospital 
effect rather than a market demand effect.  And, given the breadth of services tested, an 35 
alternative theory based on market demand heterogeneity would require the unlikely scenario that 
an entering hospital could to gather information on and make choices about complex bundles of 
good.  With only these results, however, it is difficult to differentiate between causal 
explanations such as isomorphism, local culture, competition, or market segmentation. 
These results have practical implications for tax policy and health care regulatory policy 
which are worth noting, though are discussed in detail elsewhere (Horwitz, 2003).  First, theory 
supports subsidizing nonprofit organizations on efficiency grounds based on the positive 
externalities they create (e.g. medical research, education, and disease control) or the agency 
problems they solve (e.g. they are more trustworthy decision-makers), which could be tested in 
many ways (Gentry and Penrod, 2000).  These findings suggest that in measuring community 
benefit, policymakers should consider more than the provision of uncompensated care. 
For example, in addition to public goods such as relatively unprofitable care for the poor, 
nonprofits provide private goods such as the availability of medically appropriate services for 
insured patients.  To the extent that well-insured or wealthy patients want unprofitable services, 
they may not be able to buy them because of distortions caused by regulations forcing hospitals 
to take all comers.  Well-insured patients, for example, may want and be willing to pay for a 
local trauma center.  Under normal market conditions, a for-profit hospital would meet this 
demand.  But, because hospitals must stabilize nonpaying, emergency patients before transferring 
them to other hospitals, trauma centers can become big money losers.  Nonprofits and 
government hospitals can address this allocative inefficiency because they decide which services 
to provide on grounds other than profit maximization. 
Finally, ownership might be used helpfully to regulate.  When purchasing goods such as 
healthcare, where payers cannot specify the goods they want to buy nor monitor their supply, 36 
payment incentives should be low-powered to avoid under-serving needy patients (Newhouse, 
2001).  Complicated reimbursement systems have been developed to combat the risks of 
contracting under these circumstances, namely selection and skimping.  With evidence that the 
responsiveness to financial incentives differ by form, payers could adjust rates by or selectively 
contract with different firm types. 37 
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Table 1.  Comparison of Services Offered at Study Hospitals, by Ownership, 1988-2000 
 




Unprofitable  Variable 
Capital 
Intensive 
AIDS (Outpatient)  11    X     
AIDS Services  54    X     
AIDS Unit  04    X     
Alcohol Beds  30    X     
Alcohol/ Drug (Outpatient)  33    X     
Angioplasty  40  X      X 
Birthing Room  69  X      X 
Burn Treatment  05    X    X 
Cardiac Catheterization Lab  54  X      X 
Computed Tomography Scanner (CT Scanner)  92  X      X 
Child Psychiatric Services  25    X     
Diagnostic Radioisotope Facility  81  X       
Emergency Room  96    X    X 
Extracorporeal Shock-Wave Lithotripter  17  X      X 
Fitness Center  24  X       
HIV Test  60    X     
Home Health  44      X   
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)  46  X      X 
Neonatal Intensive Care  35  X      X 
Obstetrics (beds)  73    X     
Obstetrics (births)  71    X     
Open Heart Surgery  34  X      X 
Orthopedic Surgery  92  X       
Pediatric Intensive Care Unit  22  X      X 
Positron Emission Tomography  06  X      X 
Psychiatric (inpatient)  49    X     
Psychiatric Emergency Services  48    X     
Skilled Nursing   35      X   
Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography  45  X      X 
Sports Medicine  32  X       
Trauma Center  25    X    X 
Ultrasound  96  X       
Women’s Center  47  X         
 
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of American Hospital Association Annual Surveys, 1988-2000. 
NOTE: Includes all non-rural, general medical and surgical hospitals in MSAs >1 hospital. 
  
Table 2.  Model Predictions 
 
Theory  Predictions 
Objectives Theories: 
Profit-seeking v. Community Need 
 
Profitable Services:       F>N>G 
Unprofitable Services:  G>N>F 
 
 
Capital Constraint Theories: 












Profitable Services:      NF Markets > NOther Markets 
GF Markets > GOther Markets 
Unprofitable Services:  NF Markets < NOther Markets 
                                      GF Markets < GOther Markets 
 




Table 3.  U.S. General Surgical and Medical Hospitals –Urban 
 
 
Year  Gov  NFP  FP  Total 
1988  521  1863  530  2914 
1989  508  1843  518  2869 
1990  504  1830  494  2828 
1991  490  1829  478  2797 
1992  486  1803  470  2759 
1993  493  1783  469  2745 
1994  471  1760  467  2698 
1995  459  1713  483  2655 
1996  449  1680  487  2616 
1997  422  1634  506  2562 
1998  407  1642  481  2530 
1999  431  1692  473  2596 
2000  410  1682  470  2562 
Total  6,051  22,754  6,326  35,131 
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of AHA Survey, 1988-2000. 
NOTE: All federal hospitals except veterans’ hospitals are excluded.  Nonprofit hospitals  
include secular and religious hospitals.  For-profit hospitals include proprietary 
and corporate hospitals. Table 4.  Summary of Independent Variables 
 
Variable  Mean 
Nonprofit  0.65 
Government  0.17 
For-Profit  0.18 
Admission Quartile 1 (mean total admissions = 1,950)  0.25 
Admission Quartile 2 (mean total admissions = 5,410)  0.25 
Admission Quartile 3 (mean total admissions = 9,930)  0.25 
Admission Quartile 4 (mean total admissions = 20,420)  0.25 
MSA Size 1 (population < 100,000)  0.02 
MSA Size 2 (100,000 < population < 250,000)  0.14 
MSA Size 3 (250,000 < population < 500,000)  0.16 
MSA Size 4 (500,000 < population < 1,000,000)  0.16 
MSA Size 5 (1,000,000 < population < 2,500,000)  0.27 
MSA Size 6 (population >2,500,000)  0.25 
Teaching Hospital  0.13 
Northeast  0.21 
South  0.35 
Midwest  0.23 
West  0.21 
% male  0.49 
% white  0.79 
% black  0.13 
ln (household income)  *10.35 
% baby  0.01 
% age 1to17  0.24 
% age 18to29  0.19 
% age 30to39  0.17 
% age 40to49  0.09 
% age 50to 64  0.13 
% ￿ age 65  0.12 
% ￿ age 80  0.03 
Elementary education  0.18 
High school diploma  0.22 
Some college  0.20 
College degree  0.15 
* approximately $31,250   
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of AHA Annual Survey, 1988-2000. 













































SOURCE:  Author’s analysis of data from American Hospital Association Annual Surveys, 1988-2000. 
NOTES: Probit predicted probabilities include all general and surgical, non-rural hospitals in MSAs > 1 hospital.  P 
values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted probabilities of offering services 
1988 – 2000 by hospital type.  (NFP v. FP:  P<0.001; NFP v. Gov:  P=0.001; FP v. Gov: P<0.001).   
 














































SOURCE: Author’s analysis of data from American Hospital Association Annual Surveys, 1988-2000. 
NOTES: Probit predicted probabilities include all general and surgical, non-rural hospitals in MSAs > 1 hospital.  P 
values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted probabilities of offering services 
1988 – 2000 by hospital type.  (NFP v. FP: P= 0.001; NFP v. Gov: P<0.001; FP v. Gov:  P<0.001).    














































SOURCE: Author’s analysis of data from American Hospital Association Annual Surveys, 1988-2000. 
NOTES: Probit predicted probabilities include all general and surgical, non-rural hospitals in MSAs > 1 hospital.  P 
values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted probabilities of offering services 
1988 – 2000 by hospital type.  (NFP v. FP:  P<0.001; NFP v. Gov: P=0.0705; FP v. Gov: P<0.001). 
 
  












SOURCE: Author’s analysis of data from American Hospital Association Annual Surveys, 1988-2000. 
NOTES: Probit predicted probabilities include all general and surgical, non-rural hospitals in MSAs > 1 hospital.  P 
values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted probabilities of offering services 
1988 – 2000 by hospital type.  (NFP v. FP:  P<0.001; NFP v. Gov: P=0.003; FP v. Gov: P<0.001). 
 










SOURCE: Author’s analysis of data from American Hospital Association Annual Surveys, 1988-2000. 
NOTES: Probit predicted probabilities include all general and surgical, non-rural hospitals in MSAs > 1 hospital.  P 
values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted probabilities of offering services 











































































FPTable 5.  Comparison of Services Offered by Ownership Type, 1988-2000 
Profitable Services  F>N  F>G  N>G 
Angioplasty (1989-2000)  Y***  Y***  Y*** 
Birthing Room@  N*  N  Y 
Cardiac Catheterization Lab  Y***  Y***  Y*** 
Computed Tomography Scanner (CT Scanner)  N  Y  Y* 
Diagnostic Radioisotope Facility  N*  Y***  Y*** 
Extracorporeal Shock-Wave Lithotripter  Y***  Y***  Y*** 
Fitness Center  N**  N  Y** 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging  Y  Y***  Y*** 
Neonatal Intensive Care@
 (beds>0)  Y***  Y***  N*** 
Open Heart Surgery   Y***  Y***  Y*** 
Orthopedic Surgery (1989-1993)  N  Y***  Y*** 
Pediatric Intensive Care@(beds>1)  Y***  Y***  N*** 
 
Positron Emission Tomography (1990-2000)  Y  Y*  Y 
 
Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography (1990-2000)  N**  Y  Y*** 
Sports Medicine  =  Y***  Y*** 
Ultrasound  N***  N  Y 
Women’s Center@  Y***  Y***  Y* 
       
Unprofitable Services  F>N  F>G  N>G 
AIDS (Outpatient) (1988-1993)
   N  N***  N*** 
AIDS Services (1994-2000)  N***  N***  N*** 
AIDS Unit (1988-1993)  Y**  N  N*** 
Alcohol/Drug Inpatient (Beds>1)  Y***  Y*  N*** 
Alcohol/ Drug Outpatient  N***  N***  N*** 
Burn Treatment (Beds > 0)  Y  N*  N*** 
Child/Adolescent Psychiatric @ (Beds > 0)  N  N*  N 
Emergency Room  N**  Y  Y*** 
Emergency Room@  N*  =  Y 
HIV Test (1988-1991)  N  N*  N* 
Obstetrics (beds >2) @  N  N  N 
Obstetrics (births >= 100) @  N***  N**  N 
Psychiatric Inpatient (1989 – 2000, beds>1)  Y**  N***  N*** 
Psychiatric Emergency Services  N***  N***  N*** 
Psychiatric Emergency Services@  N***  N***  N 
Trauma Center  N**  N  Y 
Trauma Center@  N**  N***  N*** 
NOTE: (F = For-profit; N=Not-for-Profit, G=Government.  @ excludes veterans’ hospital.  ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.10; “=” if difference between firms < .003.  1988 – 2000 unless noted.  High initial capital investment services in 
italics. 
 Table 6. Comparison of Probability of Offering Services With Variable Profits, by 
Ownership Type 
  Profitable (1992-1996)  Unprofitable (1997-2000) 
  F  N  G  F  N  G 




Skilled Nursing  + 28.1   + 15.4   + 4.9  + 2.8   + 4.7  + 9.7 
             
SOURCE:  Author’s analysis of data American Hospital Association Annual Surveys 1988-2000. 
NOTES: F = For-profit; N=Not-for-Profit, G=Government.  Values are the percentage point change in 
probability of offering service during the years indicated. Table 7.  Hypothesis Tests 
   
Services, years 1988 -- 
2000    Means       
Hypothesis Test (Average All 
Years)        Hypothesis Test (Joint All Years) 
(unless otherwise noted)    NFP    GOV    FP        FP/NFP    GOV/NFP    FP/GOV        FP/NFP    GOV/NFP    FP/GOV 
                                             
ESWL    0.169   0.131   0.217       12.630   8.850   29.020       21.820   17.390   42.600 
                  0.000   0.003   0.000       0.058   0.182   0.000 
                                       
Home Health    0.468   0.459   0.330       63.100   0.160   34.800       226.550   21.130   205.570 
                  0.000   0.688   0.000       0.000   0.071   0.000 
                                       
Home Health    0.421   0.391   0.205       89.740   1.720   47.880       96.040   6.600   59.670 
(1988--1993)                  0.000   0.190   0.000       0.000   0.359   0.000 
                                       
Home Health    0.525   0.518   0.595       7.750   40.590   61.730       11.130   1.260   7.210 
(1995 -- 1997)                  0.005   0.000   0.000       0.011   0.738   0.065 
                                       
Home Health    0.495   0.539   0.262       79.000   2.680   72.640       85.490   3.570   81.750 
(1998 -- 2000)                  0.000   0.102   0.000       0.000   0.312   0.000 
                                       
MRI    0.484   0.409   0.507       1.710   20.440   24.240       22.510   35.980   38.910 
                  0.191   0.000   0.000       0.048   0.001   0.000 
                                       
Open Heart Surgery    0.336   0.279   0.409       20.630   11.090   38.190       29.300   30.460   54.910 
                  0.000   0.001   0.000       0.006   0.004   0.000 
                                       
Psychiatric ER    0.475   0.559   0.408       12.310   20.190   41.610       16.960   34.790   47.790 


















NOTES: Probit predicted probabilities include all general and 
surgical, non-rural hospitals in MSAs >1 hospital.  P values are 
based on the chi-square test of the differences between average 
predicted probabilities of offering services 1988 – 2000 by 
hospital type.  (FP v other: not significant). 






Figure 5b. Home Health, Market Penetration 











NOTES: Probit predicted probabilities include all beneral and 
surgical, non-rural hospitals in MSAs >1 hospital.  P values are 
based on the chi-square test of the differences between average 
predicted probabilities of offering services 1988 – 2000 by 





















NOTES: Probit predicted probabilities include all general 
and surgical, non-rural hospitals in MSAs >1 hospital.  P 
values are based on the chi-square test of the differences 
between average predicted probabilities of offering services 
1988 – 2000 by hospital type.  (FP v other: P<0.01). 
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NOTES: Probit predicted probabilities include all general and 
surgical, non-rural hospitals in MSAs >1 hospital.  P values are based 
on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted 
probabilities of offering services 1988 – 2000 by hospital type.  (FP v 
other: P<0.01 (1994-1997)). 
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NOTES: Probit predicted probabilities include all general and 
surgical, non-rural hospitals in MSAs >1 hospital.  P values are based 
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NOTES: Probit predicted probabilities include all general  
and surgical, non-rural hospitals in MSAs >1 hospital.  P 
values are based on the chi-square test of the differences 
between average predicted probabilities of offering services 
1988 – 2000 by hospital type.  (FP v other: not significant). 
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 Table 8.   Hypothesis Test for Market Effects Tests
 
  FP Market >= 20%  Share 
Service  Other  FP 20%  Chi2/Pr>Chi^2 
Open Heart Surgery       
NFP Hospitals  0.32 0.374  5.045
    0.025
Gov Hospitals  0.255 0.347  7.313
    0.007
FP Hospitals  0.391 0.431  1.39
    0.239
   
Psychiatric ER   
NFP Hospitals  0.481 0.436  3.262
    0.071
88-93  0.477 0.463  0.216
    0.642
94-00  0.484 0.413  18.119
    0.011
   
Gov Hospitals  0.546 0.592  1.641
    0.200
FP Hospitals  0.392 0.4  0.044
    0.835
   
Home Health   
NFP Hospitals  0.457 0.516  4.119
    0.042
   
       Gov Hospitals  0.472 0.418  1.233
    0.267
FP Hospitals  0.326 0.333  0.009
    0.923
       88-93  0.231 0.188  1.673
    0.196
       94-97  0.5 0.613  8.089
    0.004
 Appendix A.  Selected Probit Coefficients for Representative Services 
(controlling for hospital, region, and demographic characteristics) 
 
Service  Open Heart Surgery    Psychiatric ER    Home Health 
Observations  32231    32058    31980 
Log Likelihood  -11667.26    -18060.59    -19975.22 
   Coef.  Std. Err.     Coef.  Std. Err.     Coef.  Std. Err. 
Gov  -0.420  0.098   0.247  0.070   -0.077  0.068 
Fp  0.397  0.100   -0.172  0.082   -0.745  0.088 
y1989  0.040  0.020   -0.019  0.021   0.010  0.019 
y1990  0.116  0.023   -0.003  0.026   0.016  0.023 
y1991  0.198  0.028   -0.007  0.028   0.024  0.026 
y1992  0.240  0.030   0.038  0.031   0.031  0.028 
y1993  0.315  0.034   0.065  0.033   0.119  0.029 
y1994  0.336  0.037   0.027  0.036   0.223  0.034 
y1995  0.330  0.038   0.001  0.037   0.279  0.035 
y1996  0.330  0.040   0.008  0.038   0.289  0.037 
y1997  0.352  0.043   0.003  0.040   0.365  0.038 
y1998  0.343  0.045   0.005  0.040   0.299  0.039 
y1999  0.453  0.046   -0.012  0.040   0.235  0.039 
y2000  0.436  0.047   0.016  0.041   0.160  0.040 
govy1989  0.085  0.053   0.020  0.050   -0.044  0.038 
govy1990  0.100  0.061   0.011  0.057   -0.002  0.045 
govy1991  0.146  0.067   0.055  0.062   0.034  0.052 
govy1992  0.116  0.071   -0.039  0.069   -0.001  0.055 
govy1993  0.130  0.084   -0.056  0.073   -0.024  0.058 
govy1994  0.164  0.089   -0.077  0.078   -0.021  0.068 
govy1995  0.156  0.090   -0.022  0.081   0.040  0.071 
govy1996  0.190  0.091   -0.014  0.085   0.081  0.076 
govy1997  0.090  0.102   0.044  0.090   0.050  0.081 
govy1998  0.131  0.105   0.062  0.093   0.163  0.085 
govy1999  0.070  0.108   0.042  0.093   0.206  0.086 
govy2000  0.242  0.108   0.125  0.093   0.216  0.088 
fpy1989  0.003  0.050   0.046  0.059   -0.003  0.062 
fpy1990  -0.042  0.062   -0.007  0.071   0.014  0.072 
fpy1991  -0.076  0.069   -0.038  0.080   -0.019  0.084 
fpy1992  -0.055  0.082   -0.055  0.089   0.125  0.092 
fpy1993  -0.056  0.087   -0.061  0.092   0.325  0.093 
fpy1994  -0.015  0.091   -0.033  0.096   0.748  0.100 
fpy1995  -0.047  0.095   -0.066  0.098   0.923  0.102 
fpy1996  -0.051  0.102   -0.077  0.101   0.992  0.108 
fpy1997  -0.058  0.106   -0.070  0.103   0.882  0.108 
fpy1998  -0.011  0.109   -0.073  0.105   0.242  0.111 
fpy1999  -0.088  0.116   -0.094  0.110   -0.034  0.114 
fpy2000  -0.013  0.111   0.036  0.103   0.014  0.114 
Cons  8.364  5.493    0.077  3.992    6.350  3.846 
Robust standard errors. Appendix A (cont).  Selected Probit Coefficients for Representative Services  
(controlling for hospital, region, and demographic characteristics) 
Service  MRI  ESWL 
Observations  31972  32118 
Log Likelihood  -16964.80  -12145.15 
   Coef.  Std. Err.     Coef.  Std. Err. 
Gov  -0.383  0.082   -0.142  0.105 
Fp  -0.195  0.091   0.322  0.106 
y1989  0.120  0.025   0.161  0.035 
y1990  0.241  0.033   0.156  0.043 
y1991  0.356  0.036   0.277  0.046 
y1992  0.514  0.039   0.356  0.048 
y1993  0.697  0.041   0.491  0.050 
y1994  0.989  0.043   0.578  0.050 
y1995  1.107  0.044   0.633  0.051 
y1996  1.172  0.046   0.648  0.053 
y1997  1.221  0.047   0.704  0.054 
y1998  1.288  0.048   0.736  0.056 
y1999  1.397  0.049   0.830  0.055 
y2000  1.438  0.048   0.954  0.055 
govy1989  0.057  0.059   0.022  0.078 
govy1990  0.117  0.075   0.037  0.097 
govy1991  0.176  0.080   0.003  0.107 
govy1992  0.181  0.085   -0.060  0.112 
govy1993  0.166  0.091   0.031  0.117 
govy1994  0.088  0.097   -0.092  0.123 
govy1995  0.051  0.097   -0.187  0.126 
govy1996  0.066  0.100   -0.153  0.126 
govy1997  0.139  0.104   -0.138  0.131 
govy1998  0.215  0.108   -0.009  0.132 
govy1999  0.196  0.108   -0.032  0.130 
govy2000  0.256  0.109   -0.025  0.131 
fpy1989  0.031  0.077   -0.090  0.072 
fpy1990  0.159  0.095   -0.105  0.101 
fpy1991  0.184  0.103   -0.078  0.112 
fpy1992  0.109  0.108   -0.146  0.119 
fpy1993  0.282  0.105   -0.117  0.123 
fpy1994  0.393  0.112   -0.037  0.121 
fpy1995  0.365  0.114   -0.007  0.123 
fpy1996  0.374  0.116   -0.119  0.126 
fpy1997  0.376  0.118   -0.178  0.122 
fpy1998  0.410  0.119   -0.142  0.127 
fpy1999  0.377  0.121   -0.113  0.127 
fpy2000  0.353  0.118   -0.239  0.126 
Cons  -4.802  3.504    -2.536  4.133 
Robust standard errors. Appendix B.  Selected Probit Coefficients, Market Effects Tests 
Controlling for hospital, region, and demographic characteristics; excluded category is NFP hospitals in 1994. 
 
Service  Open Heart Surgery  Home Health  Psychiatric ER 
Log Likelihood  -11816.168    -19961.012    -18084.506   
No. of Obs.  32231    31980    32058   
Variables  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
NFP*1988  -.390  .0358  -.187  .0351  -.0212  .0383 
NFP*1989  -.334  .0355  -.198  .0346  -.0548  .0371 
NFP*1990  -.258  .0318  -.191  .0348  -.0338  .0357 
NFP*1991  -.181  .0308  -.188  .0339  -.0440  .0332 
NFP*1992  -.104  .0227  -.181  .0316  .00258  .0319 
NFP*1993  -.0172  .0206  -.107  .0271  .0247  .0310 
NFP*1995  -.0231  .0255  .0485  .0201  -.0195  .0215 
NFP*1996  -.0185  .0312  .0528  .0265  .00199  .0292 
NFP*1997  .0163  .0371  .137  .0317  .00264  .0329 
NFP*1998  .0260  .0354  .0912  .0354  .0176  .0379 
NFP*1999  .155  .0449  .0187  .0369  -.0111  .0341 
NFP*2000  .123  .0450  -.0608  .0451  .0244  .0386 
GOV*1988  -.808  .131  -.221  .0720  .128  .0838 
GOV*1989  -.640  .131  -.273  .0718  .168  .0848 
GOV*1990  -.628  .131  -.209  .0750  .172  .0827 
GOV*1991  -.496  .131  -.140  .0776  .218  .0811 
GOV*1992  -.447  .127  -.186  .0751  .201  .0858 
GOV*1993  -.388  .134  -.159  .0774  .196  .0846 
GOV*1994  -.306  .132  -.0731  .0858  .111  .0825 
GOV*1995  -.328  .137  .0683  .0855  .122  .0810 
GOV*1996  -.295  .137  .136  .0955  .199  .0900 
GOV*1997  -.355  .144  .213  .107  .227  .0951 
GOV*1998  -.346  .137  .201  .107  .227  .107 
GOV*1999  -.246  .146  .257  .101  .201  .106 
GOV*2000  -.111  .137  .135  .104  .312  .103 
FP*1988  .105  .145  -.767  .129  -.278  .148 
FP*1989  .0866  .152  -.814  .131  -.198  .119 
FP*1990  .0723  .147  -.772  .115  -.310  .126 
FP*1991  -.0517  .163  -.770  .130  -.387  .135 
FP*1992  .216  .133  -.786  .113  -.296  .116 
FP*1993  .253  .152  -.450  .114  -.352  .129 
FP*1994  .357  .135  -.238  .103  -.292  .110 
FP*1995  .366  .155  .0969  .117  -.255  .128 
FP*1996  .314  .156  .178  .127  -.270  .116 
FP*1997  .284  .165  .187  .100  -.224  .142 
FP*1998  .488  .124  -.355  .102  -.232  .179 
FP*1999  .498  .168  -.583  .142  -.230  .162 
FP*2000  .546  .161  -.729  .142  -.346  .143 
NFP*FPMarket*1988  .113  .159  -.282  .102  -.172  .105 
NFP*FPMarket*1989  .0969  .146  -.134  .0962  -.0917  .124 
NFP*FPMarket*1990  .171  .139  -.130  .0976  -.110  .101 
NFP*FPMarket*1991  .259  .145  -.0871  .0975  -.0641  .0946 
NFP*FPMarket*1992  .336  .178  .0143  .140  -.00320  .101 
NFP*FPMarket*1993  .246  .153  .192  .128  .0644  .103 
NFP*FPMarket*1994  .306  .164  .281  .122  -.0892  .128 
NFP*FPMarket*1995  .262  .125  .303  .102  -.127  .102 
NFP*FPMarket*1996  .214  .117  .310  .0859  -.179  .0893 
NFP*FPMarket*1997  .171  .110  .347  .106  -.207  .103 
NFP*FPMarket*1998  .0811  .132  .187  .105  -.344  .0982 
NFP*FPMarket*1999  .0899  .115  .155  .0942  -.251  .0981 
NFP*FPMarket*2000  .144  .132  .133  .125  -.317  .102 
GOV*FPMarket*1988  -.324  .207  -.452  .162  .500  .150 
GOV*FPMarket*1989  -.333  .243  -.416  .155  .352  .144 
GOV*FPMarket*1990  -.00551  .208  -.422  .146  .358  .133 
GOV*FPMarket*1991  .125  .185  -.480  .153  .373  .132 
GOV*FPMarket*1992  .126  .219  -.468  .174  .217  .158 
GOV*FPMarket*1993  .277  .210  -.201  .176  .274  .138 Appendix B (cont).  Selected Probit Coefficients, Market Effects Tests 
 
GOV*FPMarket*1994  .246  .217  -.0196  .177  .310  .165 
GOV*FPMarket*1995  .186  .262  .0187  .178  .373  .150 
GOV*FPMarket*1996  .137  .224  .0197  .168  .186  .129 
GOV*FPMarket*1997  .0217  .234  -.0270  .180  .311  .139 
GOV*FPMarket*1998  .123  .222  .176  .182  .406  .158 
GOV*FPMarket*1999  -.00914  .197  .0113  .153  .291  .121 
GOV*FPMarket*2000  .207  .183  .0563  .158  .420  .143 
FP*FPMarket*1988  .170  .144  -1.04  .120  -.225  .108 
FP*FPMarket*1989  .252  .163  -1.00  .136  -.228  .130 
FP*FPMarket*1990  .308  .154  -.987  .128  -.220  .138 
FP*FPMarket*1991  .407  .146  -1.03  .122  -.241  .152 
FP*FPMarket*1992  .458  .159  -.778  .127  -.231  .141 
FP*FPMarket*1993  .547  .170  -.524  .116  -.159  .137 
FP*FPMarket*1994  .584  .170  .264  .104  -.210  .134 
FP*FPMarket*1995  .494  .133  .367  .125  -.330  .124 
FP*FPMarket*1996  .514  .134  .436  .116  -.328  .107 
FP*FPMarket*1997  .556  .134  .378  .111  -.348  .105 
FP*FPMarket*1998  .514  .158  -.413  .0934  -.345  .104 
FP*FPMarket*1999  .554  .142  -.800  .0914  -.394  .114 
FP*FPMarket*2000  .609  .154  -.780  .101  -.116  .104 
 